Written by Juliette Poelman
Published on 13 July 2026
Do human rights provide adequate protection for climate refugees?
This final publication will examine whether human rights law offers adequate protection for climate refugees, using the case of Teitiota v. New Zealand as a focal point. Furthermore, the dissenting opinion of Committee member Muhumuza will be addressed.
Publication series on the rights of climate refugees
Juliette wrote her thesis on the position of the climate refugee within international law to complete her Bachelor of Laws at Maastricht University. This publication consists of three parts. The first part focuses on defining the term ‘climate refugee’ and the UN Refugee Convention. The second part discusses the most well-known case regarding climate refugees, Teitiota v. New Zealand, and finally, the third part will examine whether human rights provide adequate protection for climate refugees.
Human Rights Committee Ruling in Teitiota Case
In its deliberations, the Human Rights Committee considered its General Comments No. 6 and 36. General Comment No. 36 states that in cases of non-refoulement, there must be well-founded reasons to believe that the person concerned faces a real risk that their right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR will be violated. This risk must be personal and not merely arise form general circumstances, except in the most extreme cases.1 The document further acknowledges that environmental degradation, climate change and unsustainable development pose some of the most urgent and serious threats to the ability of present and future generations to exercise the right to life.2 In Teitiota’s case, the Committee ultimately ruled that the prohibition on non-refoulement did not apply. The Committee accepted the claim that Kiribati could become uninhabitable due to sea level rise. Nevertheless, the Committee considered that Kiribati was still in a position to take appropriate measures to protect its population in cooperation with the international community.3 The Committee noted that Kiribati was already implementing measures to resist climate-related threats and, based on the information available, found no fault in the local authorities’ assessment that these measures were sufficient to protect the individual’s right to life.4 Therefore, the Committee concluded that the deportation to Kiribati did not violate his right to life.5
Dissenting Opinion
Not all members of the Human Rights Committee shared this view. In a dissenting opinion, Committee member Muhumuza argued that Teitiota did face a ‘real, personal and reasonably foreseeable risk’.6 In his view, the considerable difficulty in accessing fresh water due to environmental conditions should be sufficient to reach the risk threshold even without an actual complete lack of fresh water. It would be contradictory to the protection of the right to life to assume that the risk threshold is not reached until there is a significant number of deaths. Muhumuza further argued that the Committee’s standard is that threats to the right to life can constitute a violation of the right even if they do not result in the loss of life.7 Teitiota had provided evidence that his child had become seriously ill due to exposure to polluted water.8 According to Muhumuza, the fact that one of Teitiota’s children had already experienced serious health problems due to environmental conditions in Kiribati should have provided sufficient evidence to reach the threshold.9 Muhumuza argued that although Kiribati is taking adaptation measures to address the effects of climate change, it is clear that living conditions still do not meet standards of human dignity. Even if Kiribati takes action to improve conditions, people’s lives and dignity will remain at risk as long as conditions remain dire. Muhumuza ends his dissenting opinion with the apt observation:
‘New Zealand’s action is more like forcing a drowning person back into a sinking vessel, with the ‘justification’ that after all there are other voyagers on board.’10
As this case demonstrates, the right to life does not yet provide sufficient protection for climate refugees. The negative impacts of climate change that prompted Teitiota to seek better living conditions in New Zealand were not deemed sufficient to meet the risk threshold. Muhumuza’s dissenting opinion highlights the inadequacy of the current legal protection for climate refugees and underscores the urgent need to rethink the international legal framework to better address the challenges faced by these vulnerable individuals.
Conclusion: No Asylum Yet for the Climate Refugee
The climate refugee is not protected by the Refugee Convention because the requirements of Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention are not met. A climate refugee has no well-founded fear that falls under one of the five exhaustive grounds for persecution. While the adverse effects of climate change are harmful, and in some cases even fatal, they do not meet the threshold of persecution as currently used and understood in international and domestic law. Part of this problem lies in identifying a ‘persecutor’.
The difficulty for a climate refugee to qualify as a Convention refugee was confirmed in the case of Teitiota v New Zealand. Teitiota moved from Kiribati to New Zealand to escape the negative effects of climate change. The Tribunal (New Zealand Supreme Court) ruled that he could not qualify as a treaty refugee. According to the Tribunal, there was no ‘forced displacement’ but a voluntary adjustment migration, which meant Teitiota was not granted asylum in New Zealand.
Climate change exposes millions of people to reduced water security and acute food insecurity every year. This results in violation of basic human rights such as the right to life. According to the UN Human Rights Committee, the right to life is a ‘supreme right’ inherent in every human being and its effective protection is a precondition for the enjoyment of all human rights. ECtHR case law shows that under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, States Parties have an obligation to take appropriate measures to protect the right to life. This obligation exists if there is a ‘real and immediate risk’ to individuals and the state is aware of it. This obligation may also exist if it is uncertain whether the danger will actually materialise and also if the danger will materialise only in the longer term. The principle of non-refoulement can provide complementary protection to climate refugees.
The right to life and the non-refoulement principle were central to the case of Teitiota v New Zealand. The UN Human Rights Committee ruled that although climate change is negatively affecting Kiribati, Teitiota’s homeland, the Kiribati government still had sufficient time to take appropriate measures. Therefore, no violation of Teitiota’s right to life was found. The UN Human Rights Committee did come to the remarkable conclusion that climate change can lead to violations of the right to life and thereby trigger the non-refoulement principle.Climate change, and with it negative impacts and human rights violations, will increase in the future if states do not take appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate it.
In conclusion, I note that the current legal international frameworks do not provide adequate legal protection for climate refugees. To echo the words of Committee Member Muhumuza, it is rather like sending persons back to a drowning ship with the justification that there are other travellers on that ship.
References
1 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 36‘ (2019) CCPR/G/GC/36, no. 30.
2 UN Human Rights Committee 03-09-2019, ‘General Comment No. 36‘ (2019) CCPR/G/GC/36, no. 62.
3 UN Human Rights Committee 07-01-2020, 2728/2016, (Teitiota/ New Zealand), l.c. 9.12.
4 UN Human Rights Committee 07-01-2020, 2728/2016, (Teitiota/New Zealand), l.c. 9.12.
5 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York 16-12-1966.
6 UN Human Rights Committee 07-01-2020, 2728/2016, (Teitiota/New Zealand), annex II, l.c. 5.
7 UN Human Rights Committee 07-01-2020, 2728/2016, (Teitiota/New Zealand), annex II, l.c. 5.
8 UN Human Rights Committee 07-01-2020, 2728/2016, (Teitiota/New Zealand), l.c. 2 and 2.6.
9 UN Human Rights Committee 07-01-2020, 2728/2016, (Teitiota/New Zealand), annex II, l.c. 5.
10 UN Human Rights Committee 07-01-2020, 2728/2016, (Teitiota/New Zealand), annex II, l.c. 6.
